Veganism:
The Fundamental Principle of the Abolitionist Movement
Many animal welfare advocates claim that the rights position, which
seeks the abolition of animal use, is not practical because it
rejects incremental change and does not provide any guidance for
what we should do now—today—to help nonhumans. These critics of the
abolitionist position argue that we have no choice but to pursue
more animal-welfare regulations—more attempts to make animal
exploitation more “humane”—if we want to do something “practical”
to help animals.
The notion that animal welfare regulations
provide significant protection for animal interests is about as
wrong as wrong gets. As I have discussed in my writing, because
animals are property, they are only economic commodities with
nothing but extrinsic or conditional value. Their interests have no
inherent value. As a result, standards that require their “humane”
treatment are interpreted in an economic sense and limit protection
to what will provide an economic benefit to humans. Purported
improvements in animal welfare do very little, if anything, to
increase protection for animal interests; for the most part, they
do nothing more than to make animal exploitation more economically
efficient and socially acceptable. Moreover, there is no historical
evidence that animal welfare regulation leads to abolition.
The
welfarists are also mistaken to claim that the rights position does
not provide any practical incremental steps that we can take on the
road to abolition. There is very clear guidance for incremental
change: veganism.
Veganism is not merely a matter of diet; it is a
moral and political commitment to abolition on the individual level
and extends not only to matters of food, but to clothing, other
products, and other personal actions and choices. Becoming a vegan
is the one thing that we can all do today—right now—to help
animals. It does not require an expensive campaign, the involvement
of a large organization, legislation, or anything other than our
recognition that if “animal rights” means anything, it means that
we cannot justify consuming meat, fish, dairy, eggs, or other
animal products.
Veganism reduces animal suffering and death by
decreasing demand. It represents a rejection of the commodity
status of nonhumans and recognition of their inherent value.
Veganism is also a commitment to nonviolence and the animal rights
movement should be a movement of peace and should reject violence
against all animals—nonhuman and human.
Many animal advocates
claim to favor animal rights but continue to eat animal products.
Indeed, many “leaders” of the animal movement are not vegans. That
is no different from someone who claims to be in favor of the
abolition of slavery but who continues to own slaves.
There is no
meaningful distinction between eating flesh and eating dairy or
other animal products. Animals exploited in the dairy industry live
longer than those used for meat, but they are treated worse during
their lives, and they end up in the same slaughterhouse after which
we consume their flesh anyway. There is probably more suffering in
a glass of milk or an ice cream cone than there is in a steak. And
anyone who thinks that an egg even a so-called “free range” one is
any less a product of horrible suffering than is meat does not know
much about the egg industry.
If someone stops eating flesh but
eats more dairy or eggs as a result (as many “vegetarians” do),
this may actually increase suffering. In any event, to maintain
that there is moral distinction between eating flesh and eating
dairy, eggs, or consuming other animal products, is as silly as
maintaining that there is a moral distinction between eating large
cows and eating small cows.
Rather than embracing veganism as a
clear moral baseline, the animal advocacy movement has instead
adopted the notion that we can act ethically and still consume
animal products. Consider the following examples (of which there
are many):
•Peter Singer maintains that we can be “conscientious
omnivores” and exploit animals ethically if, for example, we choose
to eat “free-range” animals who have been raised and killed in a
relatively “humane” manner. (The
Way We Eat: Why Our Food Choices Matter,
at 81-169) Singer praises purveyors of “humanely” exploited
animals, such as Whole Foods Markets, Inc. and its CEO, John
Mackey, as “ethically responsible” (177-83) and he describes strict
veganism as “fanatical” (281).
•Tom Regan featured Mackey as the
keynote speaker for a 2005 conference entitled
The Power of One,
which focused on the ability of individuals to make meaningful
changes for nonhumans. Regan celebrates Mackey and Whole Foods as
“a driving force behind higher standards in animal welfare.”
•PETA
gave Whole Foods an
award
in 2004, claiming that the company “has consistently done more for
animal welfare than any retailer in the industry, requiring that
its producers adhere to strict standards.” PETA also gave an award
in 2004 to slaughterhouse designer
Temple Grandin,
declaring her—quite remarkably in my view—to be a
“visionary.”
•Humane Farm Animal Care,
with its partners the Humane Society of the United States, the
American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, Animal
People, World Society for the Protection of Animals, and others,
promotes the
Certified Humane Raised & Handled Label,
which it describes as “a consumer certification and labeling
program” to give consumers assurance that a labeled “egg, dairy,
meat or poultry product has been produced with the welfare of the
farm animal in mind.”
It is, of course, as a general matter,
always better to do less harm than more once we have decided to
inflict harm. If we are going to eat an animal who has been
tortured, I suppose that it is “better” to eat the one who has been
tortured less. But putting aside the question whether “humanely”
raised nonhumans are really tortured less than others, there is a
big difference between the position that less suffering is better
than more suffering, and the position that causing less suffering
makes an action morally acceptable. The notion that the animal
movement actively and explicitly promotes the latter position—that
doing less harm is a morally acceptable solution to the problem of
animal exploitation—is deeply troubling.
If X is going to rape Y,
it is “better” that he not beat Y as well. It would, however, be
morally repugnant to maintain that we can be “conscientious
rapists” by ensuring that we not beat rape victims. Similarly, it
is disturbing that animal advocates are promoting the notion that
we can be morally “conscientious omnivores” if we eat the
supposedly “humanely” produced animal products sold by “ethically
responsible” purveyors of suffering and death. No only is such a
position in conflict with the notion that nonhumans have moral
significance, but it strongly encourages people to see continued
consumption as a morally acceptable alternative to adopting a vegan
lifestyle.
Moreover, many of the animal organizations portray
veganism as involving a difficult lifestyle that requires
considerable self-sacrifice and is only for the “hardcore”
advocate. I became a vegan 24 years ago. It was not particularly
difficult back then but it is absolutely absurd to characterize it
as difficult today. It is easy to be a vegan. Sure, you are more
limited in your restaurant choices, particularly if you do not live
in or near a large city, but if this inconvenience is significant
to you and keeping you from being vegan, then you probably were not
serious about the issue anyway.
The animal movement will never
have even a hope of shifting the paradigm of speciesist hierarchy
as long as it is not absolutely clear as a baseline principle that
it is morally wrong to consume meat, fish, dairy, eggs, or any
other products made from animals.
If, in the late1980s—when the
animal advocacy community in the United States decided very
deliberately to pursue a welfarist agenda—a substantial portion of
movement resources had been invested in vegan education and
abolitionist education, there would likely be hundreds of thousands
more vegans than there are today. This is a very conservative
estimate given the hundreds of millions of dollars that have been
expended by animal advocacy groups to promote welfarist legislation
and initiatives. I maintain that having the increased number of
vegans would reduce suffering more by decreasing demand for animal
products than have all of the welfarist “successes” put together
and multiplied ten-fold. Increasing the number of vegans would also
help to build a political and economic base required for the social
change that is a necessary predicate for significant legal
change.
Given limited time and limited financial resources, it is
not clear how anyone who seeks abolition as a long-term goal, or
who at least accepts that the property status of animals is a most
serious impediment to any significant change and must at least be
radically modified, could believe that expansion of traditional
animal welfare is a rational and efficient choice—putting aside any
considerations about inconsistencies in moral theory.
Assume that
tomorrow, you have two hours to spend on animal advocacy. You
cannot do everything; you must choose. There is no doubt in my mind
that 2 hours of your time spent on passing out literature about
veganism is, in a number of ways, a much better use of your time
than 2 hours of your time campaigning for bigger battery cages or
for more “humane” forms of animal slavery.
In sum, just as someone
who says that human slavery is wrong but who continues to own
slaves is not really an abolitionist with respect to human slavery,
someone who says that animal slavery is wrong but who does not
embrace veganism as a way of life is not really an abolitionist
with respect to animal slavery. Let those of us who accept the
abolitionist approach be clear and unequivocal and promote veganism
in our words and our actions.
Gary L. Francione
© 2006 Gary L.
Francione